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phical, and methodological questions. The employment of the categories 
of heresy, reformation, and sectarian movement suggest a comparison of 
HOnen’s Pure Land movement to various schismatic movements within the 
history of Christianity. Such an implied comparison is problematic not only 
because is it impossible to compare the “ orthodoxy of Nara Buddhism*’ with 
the “ orthodoxy o f the Roman Catholic church of the Middle Ages and/or six­
teenth century Europe” but, more fundamentally, because it implies that the 
history of Christianity is paradigmatic or even normative for religious develop­
ment in general. The problem here, I believe, lies, above all, in the methodo­
logical tools available to the scholars of comparative religions. A re-evalua­
tion of Hflnen’s Pure Land movement would require a dialogue between a 
textual study o f the caliber of Kleine’s work, a comparative study of different 
conceptions of truth, orthodoxy, and heterodoxy, and a historical analysis of 
the political and religio-political situation at the beginning of the early 
Kamakura period. In addition, the various textual and interpretative tradi­
tions evaluating Hdnen’s religious, philosophical, and political significance 
will have to be evaluated not only concerning their historical accuracy or lack 
thereof but also with regard to the discourses and subtexts which underlie and 
influence the historical, textual, sectarian, ideological, and religious study of 
HOnen. Kleine’s study constitutes an important and necessary first step in such 
a dialogue.
Decorah, October 10, 1998
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To PUT IT simply, Agustin Jacinto is a phenomenon sui generis. I know of no 
one in the Western world as familiar with the writings of Nishida Kitard as he. 
Nor is there anyone who has done as much as he to introduce modern 
Japanese philosophy to the Spanish-speaking world. The two volumes of this
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anthology which he selected, translated, and annotated, together with 
Filosofia de la transformacidn del mundo (1989) and his detailed textual 
study, La filosofia social de Nishida KitarO (1994), testify to the thoroughness 
and dedication with which he has pursued that interest for the past fifteen 
years and more. Together with his wife, Tamiyo Kambe Ohara, who assists in 
checking translations and tracking down footnotes, he has done most of his 
work alone at the prestigious Colegio de MichoacAn in his native Mexico.
The overriding purpose of the present anthology, which has been many 
years in the making, is to deepen an appreciation of Japanese culture by show­
ing the vitality and creativity of its best modem philosophers. The authors 
selected to represent the field are twelve: Nishida KitarO, Tanabe Hajime, 
Nishitani Keiji, Tosaka Jun, Miki Kiyoshi, Abe Jird, Watsuji TetsurO, Kuki 
ShOzO, Nakai Masakazu, Shimomura ToratarO, Tsurumi Shunsuke, and 
Kadowaki Kakichi. Some of the material translated here has not yet appeared 
in any Western language. Nakai’s piece on “The Logic of Work in a Commit­
tee”  was a special treat (the graph on 11:237, however, was printed upside 
down and there is no direct reference to it in the text), as were the pieces on tra­
dition by Tsurumi and Miki. Personally, I was pleased to find that the section 
on Tanabe centered on the still-neglected “ logic of the specific.”
The lodestone for the selection of material, as stated on the opening page of 
the first volume and in a conclusion at the end of the second, is the thought of 
Nishida: “ What is clear is that in less than one hundred years Japan has been 
able to come up with a Japanese philosophy styled after the West and a 
philosophy that reflects the living reality of being Japanese. The best way to 
get an idea of how this came about seems to be to study in some measure the 
philosophical development of the ’father of Japanese philosophy, Nishida 
Kitard’ ”  (11:408). Figures were chosen for the influence they received from 
Nishida. That being so, the omission of Ueda Shizuteru and Takeuchi 
Yoshinori, presumably on the grounds that there are merely mago deshi of 
Nishida (1:374), will strike some readers as odd, as will the inclusion of 
Kadowaki, on whose shoulders the robe of the philosopher hangs unevenly by 
comparison. In fairness to the author, one hesitates to ask for more than the 
800 pages of text and translation he has provided; and Kadowaki was, after 
all, the teacher who first introduced Jacinto to Nishida during his studies in 
Japan some twenty-five years ago.
The introductions provided to the collection as a whole and to each of the 
contributors contains information not only not previously available in Span­
ish but missing from standard references works in English and German as 
well. In addition, the author blends in his own assessment and historical plac­
ing of the individual figures chosen for the anthology, without ever allowing 
himself to be distracted by polemics with the secondary literature. In reading
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his summary account of Japanese intellectual history, I found many points to 
question, but then again many more points that gave me pause to think. His 
own characterization of modem Japanese philosophy as having gone through 
six stages in Japan, while not entirely satisfactory, reminds the reader of the 
need for a solid survey of the field in book-length form to correct and update 
Gino Piovesana’s 1968 Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought. Dr. Jacinto 
may be the right one to give us such a book in the future.
The author is to be applauded for doing his translations fresh, directly from 
the original texts (1:11,11:416). While it is clear that he has taken advantage of 
existing translations as a check against his own work, he is able to add subtle­
ties missed or glossed over, and to do his own interpreting. Since this is the 
bread-and-butter of his work, 1 may perhaps be indulged a brief example. 
Note the following passage from the end of the opening chapter of Nishida’s 
An Inquiry into the Good, first in the Abe-Ives translation:
Regardless of its nature, as long as consciousness maintains a strict 
unity it is a pure experience: it is simply a fact. But when the unity is 
broken and a present consciousness enters into a relation with other 
consciousnesses it generates meanings and judgments. In contrast to 
pure experiences that reveal themselves to us directly, the conscious­
ness of the past has now become activated and connects with one 
part of present consciousness while conflicting with another. The 
state of pure experience thus breaks apart and crumbles away.
A recent Spanish translation of the work made directly from the above En­
glish and published under the title La indigacidn del bien (Barcelona: Gedisa, 
1995), renders the Abe-Ives passage word-for-word, except for the italicized 
phrase which it misunderstands and renders as “ without ceasing to be in 
conflict with it.”  This is what happens with translations of translations: they 
can mistranslate but not retranslate; they can disseminate scholarship but not 
advance it. For all that, they are often important intermediary steps, as in the 
case of La indigacidn del bien, which has helped to attract the attention of seri­
ous scholars in Spain to Japanese philosophy.
Now look what Jacinto does with the same passage, which I translate literal­
ly back into English for the sake of comparison:
Therefore, as long as any consciousness exists in a state of strict 
unification it is always pure experience, that it is say, it is simply a 
fact. On the contrary, when this unity is broken, that is, at the point 
that it enters into relation with another [unity], meaning and judg­
ment originate. Because consciousness of the past at once comes into 
play, in contrast to pure experience which manifests itself to us di-
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rectly, it unites with one part of present consciousness and conflicts 
with another part of it, so that the state of pure experience is ana­
lyzed and destroyed. (1:73)
The gist of the two translations is entirely the same, but let us compare them 
sentence by sentence with a rather slavish rendition of the original:
Thus whatever kind of consciousness it be, while it is in a strict state 
of unity it is always pure experience, that is, it is simply a fact.
Abe-Ives begins with a new paragraph, which is a kindness to the reader; 
Jacinto, as is his custom, follows Nishida’s paragraphing. Jacinto gives any 
consciousness whereas Abe-Ives speaks of consciousness regardless o f  its na­
ture. Both state o f  strict unification (J ) and strict unity (A-I) part from the 
original slightly. Abe-Ives speaks of consciousness as a pure experience, which 
disagrees both with Jacinto and with its own general omission of the particle.
On the contrary, when this unity is broken, that is, when it enters 
into relation with an other, it generates meanings and generates judg­
ments.
Abe-Ives speaks of coming into contact with other consciousnesses and 
Jacinto with another unity. Nishida speaks only of an other, without obliging 
us to determine whether it has to be conscious human or not, let alone another 
consciousness in a state of unity. Abe-Ives follows Nishida in giving the im­
pression that it is the broken unity that somehow generates meanings and judg­
ments, while Jacinto omits the subject to avoid the unclarity.
In contrast to pure experience which shows up before us immedi­
ately, consciousness of the past straightaway comes into play, con­
necting with one part of presence consciousness and clashing with 
another; as a result the state of pure experience gets analyzed and des­
troyed.
Abe-Ives speaks of pure experiences, while Jacinto uses the singular, taking 
the phrase as a shorthand for “ the state of pure experience.”  Whereas Jacinto 
captures Nishida’s sense of the meeting with an other as at once calling up the 
past, Abe-Ives misses the implication with the softer word now. Jacinto fol­
lows Nishida literally to speak of pure experience as being analyzed and des­
troyed, whereas Abe-Ives prefers the more lyrical breaks apart and crumbles 
away, thus missing the connection between “ judgment”  and “ analysis” 
which the text surely intended.
Such nitpicking may be as far from the concerns of the general reader as it is 
from the heart of the philosophical quest, but if there are to be reliable transla-
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tions there must be precise scholars to rely on. As far as it is in my ability to 
judge, I must say I do not always find Jacinto’s translations elegant or poetic, 
but I do find them examples of that high academic conscience that is the mark 
of a reliable scholar.
Given that the present book is aimed at a wider audience than devotees of 
Japanese philosophy, it is regrettable that comments and annotations have 
been interspersed into the body of the text, making the reader stumble over 
the brackets and interrupt the natural flow of reading; footnotes would have 
been a better choice. Anthologies are reference books, read out of sequence as 
often as not and therefore in need of good navigational tools. In this regard, it 
would have been a good idea to identify the authors in the running headers to 
save the reader the trouble of paging back and forth. More critical is the lack 
of an index. I began using these volumes several months ago, reading here and 
there in fits and starts, but when it came to putting my finger back on memora­
ble passages, I often found myself at sea without a compass. Finally, a minor 
grievance, there are a handful of inconsistencies in annotation, Japanese read­
ings, and Sanskrit orthography.
If there is one disappointment with the book that stands out above all the 
rest, however, it is the fact that his introductory comments do not more di­
rectly address the intellectual history peculiar to the Spanish-speaking world, 
if not to Mexico in particular. It is one thing to compare Japanese thinkers 
with those whom they considered their counterparts in Europe and the United 
States; this is, of course, too important to overlook. But it is another to open 
at least a few direct connections, as his direct translation intimates needs to be 
done, to the great thinkers of Spain and Latin America that might inspire 
younger scholars to follow up on with more careful study. I recall discussing 
with him some years ago on a Sunday afternoon at the bullfights in Mexico 
City my fear that his work will be set aside by more general audiences as esoter­
ic and left to specialists in Eastern thought. I still carry that fear, and along 
with it the hope that future volumes will be able to redress the lack.
At present, I am engaged with young scholars from Barcelona in preparing 
a translation of Nishitani’s Religion and Nothingness. The translations in Dr. 
Jacinto’s Antologia have already served us well in our work, as I am sure they 
will serve others similarly in the future. I wish these volumes every success, 
and hope that the author and his publishers will find a way to secure them a 
wider distribution so that they can begin to show up in the classrooms of 
Spain and Latin America where world philosophy is taught.
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